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On Tuesday, UK regulators implemented Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1883 by removing the following individual:

1. AL-TRABELSI, Mourad Ben Ali Ben Al-Basheer

DOB: (1) 20/05/1969. (2) 02/09/1966. (3) 02/09/1964. (4) 02/02/1963. (5) 04/02/1965. (6) 02/03/1965. (7) 09/02/1965. (8) –/–/1972. (9) 09/02/1964. (10) 01/04/1966. (11) 02/06/1964. (12) 02/06/1966. (13) 02/06/1972. (14) 02/04/1966. POB: (1) Manzil Tmim (2)-(6) -, (1)-(2) Tunisia (3) Libya (4) Algeria (5) Morocco (6) Lebanon a.k.a: (1) ADEL, Sassi (2) ADNAN, Ben Salah (3) ADNAN, Salah (4) AMOUR, Bentaib (5) AROURI, Farid (6) BEN ANAN, Salah (7) BEN TAIEB, Arouri, Taoufik (8) BRAHIM, Aboue, Chiba (9) BRAHIM, Abouechiba (10) FAISEL, Arouri (11) KAMEL, Salam (12) MAGID, Ben (13) MELLIT, Hasnaoui (14) MELLIT, Hasnaui (15) SALAH, Adnan (16) SSASSI, Maci (17) TAOUFIK, Arouri Nationality: Tunisian Passport Details: G827238 (Tunisian). Issued on 1 June 1996. Expired on 31 May 2001 National Identification no: 05093588 Address: Libya Street no 9, Manzil Tmim, Nabeul, Tunisia. Other Information: UN Ref QI.A.151.03. Mother’s name is Mabrukah al-Yazidi. Listed on: 18/11/2003 Last Updated: 03/03/2016 12/11/2019 Group ID: 7877.

from their ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida counter-terrorism sanctions program.


OFSI Notice

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1883

Statement of inspection in Merex International A / S (money laundering area)

In January 2018, the Danish FSA was at the money laundering inspection of Merex International A / S. The inspection included the company’s customer knowledge procedures, risk assessment as well as the company’s policy, procedures and controls in the area of ​​money laundering. The inspection only dealt with the company’s money transfer activities.

Risk assessment and summary

Merex International A / S has a limited license to conduct money transfer business in Denmark. The company’s business model consists primarily of transferring money abroad. The company has its own IT system for registering customers, while in practice the money transfers are made by the fact that the company has a partner in individual countries, with which a regular settlement is made. In addition, the company offers currency exchange and is an agent of Western Union. In addition to the Copenhagen office, Merex International A / S cooperates with a similar company in Sweden.

Money transfer business (non-banking) is generally considered to have a significant risk of being exploited for money laundering or terrorist financing. In addition, Merex International A / S transfers money to and from countries that the FSA considers to have insufficient anti-money laundering and terrorist financing rules. It is therefore the opinion of the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority that Merex International A / S’s inherent risk of being abused for money laundering and terrorist financing is high.

In the course of the inspection, the Danish FSA found that the company does not have a risk assessment in the area of ​​money laundering. Against this background, the company was instructed to prepare a risk assessment which identifies and assesses the risk of the company being abused for money laundering and terrorist financing.

In addition, the FSA found that the company does not have a policy in the area of ​​money laundering. The company was therefore instructed to develop a policy in the area of ​​money laundering, in which it determines how the risks identified in the risk assessment must be managed.

At the inspection, the Danish FSA reviewed a number of the company’s money transfer customers from December 31, 2016 to December 31, 2017.

Based on the review, the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority found that, in one case, the company had not performed sufficient customer knowledge procedure on a corporate customer prior to the money transfer. The company has not sufficiently obtained identity information on the customer’s real owners and has not clarified the ownership structure.

The company was therefore notified that in the specific case, insufficient customer knowledge procedure had been carried out and an injunction to investigate whether there was a suspicion or reasonable reason to suspect that the money transfer was or was linked to money laundering or terrorist financing. If a suspicion is identified, the company must notify the Money Laundering Secretariat of the State Attorney for Special Economic and International Crime (SØIK) of the money transfer.


Inspection Statement

Today, the Department designates Owen Ncube under Section 7031(c) of the FY 2019 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (Div. F, P.L. 116-6), as carried forward by the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2020 (Div. A, P.L. 116-59) due to his involvement in gross violations of human rights.  Section 7031(c) provides that, in cases where the Secretary of State has credible information that foreign officials have been involved in significant corruption or a gross violation of human rights, those individuals are ineligible for entry into the United States and may be publically or privately designated as such by the Secretary of State.  The Department has credible information that Owen Ncube was involved in gross violations of human rights in his capacity as Zimbabwe’s Minister of State for National Security.

We are deeply troubled by the Zimbabwean government’s use of state-sanctioned violence against peaceful protestors, and civil society, as well as against labor leaders and members of the opposition leaders in Zimbabwe.  We urge the government to stop the violence, investigate, and hold accountable officials responsible for human rights violations and abuses in Zimbabwe.

U.S. sanctions target those who engage in corruption, violate human rights, and undermine democratic institutions or processes.  State-sanctioned violence creates a culture of impunity for human rights abusers. The United States continues to support the Zimbabwean people in need, especially through humanitarian and health assistance.  We will continue to press the Government of Zimbabwe to implement necessary political and economic reforms to provide Zimbabwean citizens the prosperity, security, and well-being they deserve.


State Department Press Release

“While the regime’s decision to jail our diplomats has cast a 40-year shadow over our relations, the United States knows that the longest-suffering victims of the Iranian regime are the Iranian people. We wish nothing more for them than a future with a truly representative government and friendship with the American people.”

– Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, press statement, November 4


“The @realDonaldTrump Administration has made clear: the regime in Iran must release all missing and detained Americans, including @HelpBobLevinson, @FreeXiyueWang, @FreeTheNamazis, and others. We will not rest until they are reunited with their families.”

– Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, Twitter, November 4

  • The regime continues to unjustly detain Americans and to support terrorist proxy groups like Hizballah that engage in hostage taking.

  • The Trump Administration has made clear that the regime in Iran must release all missing and unjustly detained Americans, including Robert Levinson, Xiyue Wang, Siamak Namazi, and others. We will not rest until they are reunited with their families.

  • The U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice Program is advertising a new reward of up to $20 million for information leading to the safe location, recovery, and return of Robert Levinson, who disappeared in Iran over a decade ago with the involvement of the Iranian regime. Levinson, who has been missing since 2007, is the longest case of this kind in U.S. history.

  • Please see the press statement and Rewards for Justice and for more information.


  • “Iran’s latest nuclear escalations reflect the regime’s intentions all along: to extort the international community into accepting its violence and terror while it undermines the sovereignty of its neighbors. Members of the international community who are rightly concerned with Iran’s latest attacks and provocations should imagine how Iran would behave with a nuclear weapon. The United States will never allow this to happen.”

  • “Iran’s expansion of proliferation-sensitive activities raises concerns that Iran is positioning itself to have the option of a rapid nuclear breakout. It is now time for all nations to reject this regime’s nuclear extortion and take serious steps to increase pressure. Iran’s continued and numerous nuclear provocations demand such action.”

– Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, press statement, November 7


“@USTreasury designated 9 Iranian regime officials representing the unelected Supreme Leader whose office advances destabilizing policies around the world. The action blocks funds from flowing to a shadow network of his military and foreign affairs advisors who support terrorism.”

 State Department Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus, Twitter, November 4

  • The U.S. Department of the Treasury took action against nine appointees and one entity representating the office of Ali Khamenei, the Iranian regime’s unelected Supreme Leader, whose office is responsible for advancing Iran’s radical agenda.

  • The designation seeks to block funds from flowing to a shadow network of Khamenei’s military and foreign affairs advisors who have oppressed the Iranian people, supported terrorism, and advanced destabilizing policies around the world for decades. The action specifically targets Ali Khamenei’s appointees in the Office of the Supreme Leader, the Expediency Council, the Armed Forces General Staff, and the Judiciary.

  • Two of the Supreme Leader’s appointees, who were sanctioned as part of this action have also been linked to the 1983 U.S. Marine barrack bombing in Beirut that killed 241 U.S. personnel and the 1994 bombing of Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA). As recently as October 2019, a representative of the Supreme Leader directly called on regional Iran-backed militias to capture Western embassies.

  • This action was taken pursuant to President Donald J. Trump’s Executive Order (E.O.) 13876, signed on June 24, 2019. The E.O. imposed sanctions on the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Supreme Leader’s Office (SLO), and authorized sanctions on others associated with the Supreme Leader or the SLO. These actions complement Treasury’s previous additions of Supreme Leader Khamenei and the Iranian regime’s Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, to OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List).

  • Please see the press statement and the Department of Treasury for more information.


State Department Fact Sheet

Venezuela: Council renews sanctions until 14 November 2020

In light of the ongoing political, economic, social and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela with persistent actions undermining democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights, the Council today extended the restrictive measures against Venezuela for one year, until 14 November 2020. The measures include an embargo on arms and on equipment for internal repression as well as a travel ban and an asset freeze on 25 listed individuals in official positions who are responsible for human rights violations and/or for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela.

These measures are intended to help encourage democratic shared solutions in order to bring political stability to the country and allow it to address the pressing needs of the population. The targeted measures are flexible and reversible and designed not to harm the Venezuelan population.


EU Notice

Restrictive Measures on Venezuela

On November 7, the United States, acting in support of the Nicaraguan people and their calls for a return to democratic governance, again demonstrated its commitment to use all economic and diplomatic tools to hold the Ortega regime accountable for human rights abuses and rampant corruption.

The United States has sanctioned key regime officials Roberto Jose Lopez Gomez, Ramon Antonio Avellan Medal, and Lumberto Ignacio Campbell Hooker pursuant to Executive Order 13851 (“Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Nicaragua”). With this action, their U.S. assets are blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with Lopez, Avellan, and Campbell.  Avellan was concurrently designated under the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anti-Corruption Act of 2018.

Avellan is Deputy Director General of the Nicaraguan National Police (NNP) and has been instrumental in maintaining Ortega’s control of the police and his parapolice counterparts, essential tools of the regime’s repression. The NNP conducts arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial executions, and disappearances of anti-government protesters. This campaign of repression by the NNP and parapolice under Avellan’s command has led to scores of deaths and hundreds more injured. Campbell is the Acting President of the Supreme Electoral Council and responsible for electoral manipulation in Ortega’s favor, ensuring Ortega and his allies prevail in elections through fraudulent means. Lopez is a retired Army officer and Director of the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute (INSS). He orchestrated President Ortega’s use of public retirement funds to reward loyalists and defraud Nicaraguans, in addition to employing INSS enforcement mechanisms to target political opponents.

The Ortega regime must cease its repression and respond to Nicaraguans’ call for genuinely free and fair elections that are both transparent and early. It is imperative the regime honor the commitments it has already made as part of negotiations with the Civic Alliance and under the Inter-American Democratic Charter. We call on Nicaragua to release – fully and unconditionally – all arbitrarily detained persons and to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. The United States and the international community will continue to promote accountability for those who blatantly disregard human rights and foment violence in support of the Ortega regime.


State Department Press Release

On Friday, OFAC corrected a bunch of mistakes in the following Nicaragua sanctions listing:

LOPEZ GOMEZ, Roberto Jose, Calle Real Xalteva, De La Iglesia De Xalteva 75 VRS Al Este, Granada, Nicaragua; DOB 07 Apr 1971; POB Granada, Nicaragua; nationality Nicaragua; Gender Male; National ID No. 2010704710008K (Nicaragua) (individual) [NICARAGUA]. -to- LOPEZ GOMEZ, Roberto Jose, Col. Pereira, CST 2C. S. 2C. O. Casa No. 1341, Managua, Managua, Nicaragua; DOB 22 Apr 1963; POB Madrid, Spain; Gender Male; National ID No. 8882204630000A (Nicaragua) (individual) [NICARAGUA].  


OFAC Notice