Iranian Sanctions

Yesterday, OFAC added the following persons to the SDN List under its Global Magnitsky human rights sanctions program:

ESSA, Salim (a.k.a. ESSA, Salim Aziz), Johannesburg, South Africa; DOB 15 Jan 1978; nationality South Africa; Gender Male; Passport M00073786 (South Africa) issued 09 Nov 2012 expires 08 Nov 2022; National ID No. 7801155017084 (South Africa) (individual) [GLOMAG]. 

 

GUPTA, Ajay (a.k.a. GUPTA, Ajay Kumar), Dubai, United Arab Emirates; DOB 05 Feb 1966; POB Saharanpur, India; nationality India; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG]. 

 

GUPTA, Atul (a.k.a. GUPTA, Atul Kumar), Dubai, United Arab Emirates; DOB 14 Jun 1968; POB Saharanpur, India; nationality South Africa; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG]. 

 

GUPTA, Rajesh (a.k.a. GUPTA, Rajesh Kumar; a.k.a. “GUPTA, Tony”), Dubai, United Arab Emirates; DOB 05 Aug 1972; POB Saharanpur, India; nationality South Africa; Gender Male; National ID No. 7208056345087 (South Africa) (individual) [GLOMAG].

and changed the following 2 listings under the Iran (both), counter terrorism and/or non-proliferation programs (1 each):

BAHMAN GROUP, No. 37, Saba Boulevard, Africa Street, P.O. Box 14335-835, Tehran 1917773844, Iran; Website http://www.bahmangroup.com; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [SDGT] [IFSR] (Linked To: ANDISHEH MEHVARAN INVESTMENT COMPANY). -to- BAHMAN GROUP, No. 37, Saba Boulevard, Africa Street, P.O. Box 14335-835, Tehran 1917773844, Iran; Website http://www.bahmangroup.com; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [SDGT] [IFSR] (Linked To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS). 

 

ROSTAMIAN, Kambiz, Villa No 13, Cluster 31 Juemierah Islands, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; DOB 27 Aug 1960; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport RE0003026 (Saint Kitts and Nevis); alt. Passport I17217816 (Iran) (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR]. -to- ROSTAMIAN, Kambiz, Villa No 13, Cluster 31 Juemierah Islands, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; DOB 27 Aug 1960; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport RE0003028 (Saint Kitts and Nevis); alt. Passport I17217816 (Iran) (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].  

And Treasury:

PRESS RELEASES

Treasury Sanctions Members of a Significant Corruption Network in South Africa 

Global Magnitsky designations target members of family business engaged in corruption, including bribery and misappropriation of state assets

Washington – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign AssetsControl (OFAC) sanctioned members of a significant corruption network in South Africa that leveraged overpayments on government contracts, bribery, and other corrupt acts to fund political contributions and influence government actions.  Specifically, OFAC designated Ajay Gupta, Atul Gupta, Rajesh Gupta, and Salim Essa for their involvement in corruption in South Africa pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.

“The Gupta family leveraged its political connections to engage in widespread corruption and bribery, capture government contracts, and misappropriate state assets.  Treasury’s designation targets the Guptas’ pay-to-play political patronage, which was orchestrated at the expense of the South African people,” said Sigal Mandelker, Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.  “The Guptas and Essa have used their influence with prominent politicians and parties to line their pockets with ill-gotten gains.  We will continue to exclude from the U.S. financial system those who profit from corruption.”

Today’s sanctions announcement demonstrates the U.S. government’s unwavering commitment to supporting the rule of law and accountability in South Africa.  We support the anti-corruption efforts of South Africa’s independent judiciary, law enforcement agencies, and the ongoing judicial commissions of inquiry.  Moreover, we commend the extraordinary work by South Africa’s civil society activists, investigative journalists, and whistleblowers, who have exposed the breadth and depth of the Gupta family’s corruption. 

THE GUPTA FAMILY

Ajay, Atul, and Rajesh Gupta immigrated to South Africa in the 1990s, and due in large part to their generous donations to a political party and their reportedly close relationship with former South African President Jacob Zuma, their business interests expanded.  The family has been implicated in several corrupt schemes in South Africa, allegedly stealing hundreds of millions of dollars through illegal deals with the South African government, obfuscated by a shadowy network of shell companies and associates linked to the family.  

Credible reports of these corruption schemes include the Gupta family offering members of the South African government money or elevated positions within the government, in return for their cooperation with Gupta family business efforts.  Public reporting has revealed Gupta family efforts to garner the cooperation of a potential Minister of Finance by promising millions of dollars in return for the individual’s assistance in removing key members of the South African government who were considered to be stumbling blocks to the Gupta family’s enterprises.  In another instance of an attempt to obtain the assistance of a member of government through illicit means, Rajesh reportedly promised a cut of a large scale development project to a provincial minister in return for the minister’s assistance.  While making this offer, Rajesh reportedly referred to two other politically powerful individuals present at the meeting as receiving large monthly payments, similar to the one being offered the provincial minister, directly from Rajesh in return for their assistance with a mining project.  In addition, the Gupta family was overpaid for government contracts and then used a portion of the proceeds of those overpayments to donate money to a South African political party.  Further, the family paid money to a South African government official in exchange for the appointment of other government officials friendly to the Gupta family business interests.  As a part of their corrupt business enterprise, South African government officials and business executives discussed ways to capture government contracts and then move the proceeds of those contracts through Gupta-owned businesses. 

AJAY GUPTA

Ajay Gupta (Ajay) is being designated for being the leader of an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, or bribery.

Ajay is the family patriarch who formulated the family’s corrupt business strategies and controlled its finances. 

ATUL GUPTA

Atul Gupta (Atul) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, or bribery.

Atul is widely known to have overseen the Gupta family’s outreach to corrupt government officials.

RAJESH GUPTA

Rajesh Gupta (Rajesh) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, or bribery.

Rajesh cultivated important relationships with the sons of powerful South African politicians and led efforts to pursue business and relationships in a South African province where corruption was rampant.  Rajesh attempted to use at least one of those relationships to seek undue influence with additional members of a South African political party.

SALIM ESSA

Salim Essa, a business associate of the Gupta family, has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, or bribery. 

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the individuals named above, and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by them, individually, or with other designated persons, that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or otherwise exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.  In addition, any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a U.S. person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited by E.O. 13818 if performed by a U.S. person or within the United States would be prohibited.

GLOBAL MAGNITSKY

Building upon the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, on December 20, 2017, the President signed E.O. 13818, in which the President found that the prevalence of human rights abuse and corruption that have their source, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States, had reached such scope and gravity that it threatens the stability of international political and economic systems.  Human rights abuse and corruption undermine the values that form an essential foundation of stable, secure, and functioning societies; have devastating impacts on individuals; weaken democratic institutions; degrade the rule of law; perpetuate violent conflicts; facilitate the activities of dangerous persons; and undermine economic markets.  The United States seeks to impose tangible and significant consequences on those who commit serious human rights abuse or engage in corruption, as well as to protect the financial system of the United States from abuse by these same persons. 

To date, the Department of the Treasury has designated 118 individuals and entities under E.O. 13818.  This figure is in addition to the numerous human rights- or corruption-related designations Treasury has issued under other various authorities.  In total, since January of 2017, Treasury has taken action against more than 680 individuals and entities engaged in activities related to, or directly involving, human rights abuse or corruption. 

and State:

Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned four individuals for corruption in South Africa pursuant to Executive Order 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.  Specifically, OFAC designated Ajay Gupta, Atul Gupta, Rajesh Gupta, and Salim Essa for their involvement in corrupt schemes with government officials and employees in state-owned enterprises for their own personal gain.  As a result of today’s actions, any property, or interest in property, of those designated within U.S. jurisdiction is blocked.  Additionally, U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with blocked persons, including entities owned or controlled by designated persons.

Today’s action demonstrates continued U.S. commitment to promoting transparency, accountability, and the rule of law globally.  We commend the critical role played by South Africa’s civil society activists, whistleblowers, and investigative journalists to shine the spotlight on the Gupta network’s elicitation of criminal abuse of public office and other acts of corruption, which have deterred investment and impeded South Africa’s economic growth.  The United States strongly supports ongoing efforts by the Government of South Africa, including its independent judiciary, judicial commissions of inquiry, and law enforcement agencies, to investigate and prosecute alleged instances of corruption.  Successfully prosecuting and deterring corruption is essential to building a future of accountable government that fosters economic growth and opportunity for all of South Africa’s citizens.

both issued press releases.

As you can see, although the Magnitsky sanctions program is ostensibly about human rights abuses, the “global” (i,e. Besides Russia) version includes corruption. Why not just a corruption program? Mr. Watchlist wonders…

Links:

OFAC Notice

Treasury Press Release

State Department Press Release

Today, the President announced a Presidential Proclamation restricting entry into the United States for senior Iranian government officials and members of their families.  For years, Iranian officials and their family members have quietly taken advantage of America’s freedom and prosperity, including excellent educational, employment, entertainment, and cultural opportunities in the United States.  Under this proclamation, designated senior regime officials and their families will no longer be allowed entry into the United States.  No longer will elites reap the benefits of a free society while the Iranian people suffer under the regime’s corruption and mismanagement.

This Presidential Proclamation is per the authority vested in the President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. 1182 (f) and 1185 (a)) and section 301 of title 3, United States Code.

The Government of Iran is the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. The regime has destabilized the Persian Gulf region with attacks on oil and shipping infrastructure.  Their support for the Houthis in Yemen and Shia militias in Iraq and Syria contribute to the regional instability and the humanitarian crises in those countries. The Iranian regime continues to suppress members of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran, as well as unjustly detaining foreign citizens to perpetuate their foreign policy aims.

America will no longer allow senior Iranian regime officials or their family members to continue to travel to the United States while their people suffer.

Link:

State Department statement

“All nations have a duty to act.  No responsible government should subsidize Iran’s bloodlust.  As long as Iran’s menacing behavior continues, sanctions will not be lifted; they will be tightened.  Iran’s leaders will have turned a proud nation into just another cautionary tale of what happens when a ruling class abandons its people and embarks on a crusade for personal power and riches.”

– President Donald J. Trump, Remarks to the 74th Session of the UNGA, September 25

 

U.S. IMPOSES SANCTIONS ON CHINESE COMPANIES FOR TRANSPORTING IRANIAN OIL

“Today, U.S. imposed new sanctions against Chinese companies that transported Iranian oil contrary to U.S. sanctions, denying the #Iran regime revenues for destabilizing conduct at the expense of the Iranian people.  We will take action on any sanctionable Iranian oil transaction.”

– Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Twitter, September 25

 “You can count on America to lead; each nation can.  As President Trump said yesterday, ‘As long as Iran’s menacing behavior continues, sanctions will not be lifted, they will be tightened.’  That path forward begins now…We’re telling China and all nations, know that we will sanction every violation of sanctionable activity.”

– Secretary Pompeo, United Against Nuclear Iran’s 2019 Iran Summit, September 25

  • The United States is taking further action as part of our maximum economic pressure campaign against the Iranian regime and those who enable its destabilizing behavior. We are imposing sanctions on certain Chinese firms for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the transport of oil from Iran, including knowledge of sanctionable conduct, contrary to U.S. sanctions.

  • This is one of the largest sanctions actions the United States has taken against entities and individuals identified as transporting Iranian oil since our sanctions were re-imposed in November 2018. This action is aimed to deny the Iranian regime critical income to engage in foreign conflicts, advance its ballistic missile development, and fund terror around the world.

  • The following Chinese firms are sanctioned under E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the transport of oil from Iran: China Concord Petroleum Co., Limited, Kunlun Shipping Company Limited, Pegasus 88 Limited, and COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Seaman & Ship Management Co, Ltd. The United States is imposing additional sanctions on the following two Chinese companies, which own or control one or more of the four companies identified above, and had knowledge of their sanctionable conduct:  Kunlun Holding Company Ltd. and COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Co., Ltd.  The United States is also imposing sanctions on the following five individuals, who are executive officers of one or more of the six companies identified above:  Bin Xu, Yi Li, Yu Hua Mao, Luqian Shen, and Yazhou Xu.

IRANIAN REGIME ELITE AND FAMILIES CAN NO LONGER TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES

“Iran’s citizens deserve a government that cares about reducing poverty, ending corruption, and increasing jobs — not stealing their money to fund a massacre abroad and at home… It is time for Iran’s leaders to finally put the Iranian people first.”

– President Donald J. Trump, Remarks to the 74th Session of the UNGA, September 25 

“Yesterday, @realDonaldTrump barred the Iranian regime’s elites and their privileged families from entering the United States. They will no longer be allowed to enjoy America’s freedom & prosperity while orchestrating the oppression of the Iranian people.”

– Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Twitter, September 26

  • The President announced a Presidential Proclamation restricting entry into the United States for senior Iranian government officials and members of their families. Under this proclamation, designated senior regime officials and their families will no longer be allowed entry into the United States.  No longer will elites reap the benefits of a free society while the Iranian people suffer under the regime’s corruption and mismanagement.

  • This Presidential Proclamation is per the authority vested in the President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. 1182 (f) and 1185 (a)) and section 301 of title 3, United States Code.

I note from the title that the US has no weekend Iran policy…

Link:

State Department Fact Sheet

Today, the United States is taking further action as part of our maximum economic pressure campaign against the Iranian regime and those who enable its destabilizing behavior.  We are imposing sanctions on certain Chinese firms for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the transport of oil from Iran, including knowledge of sanctionable conduct, contrary to U.S. sanctions.  This is one of the largest sanctions actions the United States has taken against entities and individuals identified as transporting Iranian oil since our sanctions were re-imposed in November 2018.  This action is aimed to deny the Iranian regime critical income to engage in foreign conflicts, advance its ballistic missile development, and fund terror around the world.  We are committed to fully administering our sanctions; the Iranian regime must cease these destabilizing activities or face greater economic pressure and diplomatic isolation.

The following Chinese firms are sanctioned under E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the transport of oil from Iran: China Concord Petroleum Co., Limited, Kunlun Shipping Company Limited, Pegasus 88 Limited, and COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Seaman & Ship Management Co, Ltd.  The United States is imposing additional sanctions on the following two Chinese companies, which own or control one or more of the four companies identified above, and had knowledge of their sanctionable conduct:  Kunlun Holding Company Ltd. and COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Co., Ltd.  The United States is also imposing sanctions on the following five individuals, who are executive officers of one or more of the six companies identified above:  Bin Xu, Yi Li, Yu Hua Mao, Luqian Shen, and Yazhou Xu.  The transaction in question took place after the expiration of China’s Significant Reduction Exception (SRE) on May 2, 2019, and was not covered by that SRE.  This action targets the specific entities named today, and does not target their parent companies or any other entities in their corporate groups.

Among other things, the imposition of these sanctions blocks all property and interests in property of these Chinese entities that are in the United States or within the possession or control of a U.S. person, and provides that such property and interests in property may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.  The United States is also imposing restrictions or bans on visas into the United States on the five individuals identified above.  Further, the Department of the Treasury will add these entities and individuals to its List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons.  Although this transaction involved the export of Iranian crude oil, we are similarly concerned with the export of refined oil products from Iran.

We are committed to holding the Iranian regime accountable, and we will continue to deny funding to this regime that uses its wealth and resources to enrich itself, while depriving the Iranian people of opportunity.  All entities must conduct appropriate due diligence to stay clear of sanctioned Iranian entities and sectors.  No company or nation should be willing to expose itself to the risk of sanction by possibly supporting Iran’s destabilizing activities around the world.

For more information, please go to:  https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran_r_action_faq_0925019.pdf and https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20190925.aspx.

Link:

State Department Press Release

Today, OFAC added the following persons:


LI, Yi (Chinese Simplified: 李奕), Room 202, No. 6, Lane 5848, North Zhang Yang Road, Pu Dong District, Shanghai, China; DOB 23 Feb 1975; Executive Order 13846 information: FOREIGN EXCHANGE.  Sec. 5(a)(ii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BANKING TRANSACTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(iii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY.  Sec. 5(a)(iv); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: IMPORT SANCTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(vi); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: EXCLUSION OF CORPORATE OFFICERS.  Sec. 4(e); National ID No. 310224197502233514 (individual) [IRAN-EO13846]. 

 

MAO, Yu Hua; DOB 06 Aug 1978; Executive Order 13846 information: FOREIGN EXCHANGE.  Sec. 5(a)(ii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BANKING TRANSACTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(iii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY.  Sec. 5(a)(iv); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: IMPORT SANCTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(vi); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: EXCLUSION OF CORPORATE OFFICERS.  Sec. 4(e); National ID No. 310109197808060020 (China) (individual) [IRAN-EO13846]. 

 

SHEN, Luqian, Room 32.33, No. 18, Dongayicun, Xuhui District, Shanghai, China; DOB 25 Feb 1987; Executive Order 13846 information: FOREIGN EXCHANGE.  Sec. 5(a)(ii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BANKING TRANSACTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(iii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY.  Sec. 5(a)(iv); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: IMPORT SANCTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(vi); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: EXCLUSION OF CORPORATE OFFICERS.  Sec. 4(e); Passport G54213480 (China) (individual) [IRAN-EO13846]. 

 

XU, Bin, 10-301 No. 888 Dongdaming Rd, Shanghai 200082, China; Suite 202, No. 10, Lane 888, East Da Ming Road, Shanghai, China; No. 7, Western Section, Dongfanghong Street, Mudan District, Heze, Shandong, China; DOB 21 Apr 1976; POB Heze, China; nationality China; Email Address 1044064266@qq.com; Executive Order 13846 information: FOREIGN EXCHANGE.  Sec. 5(a)(ii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BANKING TRANSACTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(iii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY.  Sec. 5(a)(iv); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: IMPORT SANCTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(vi); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: EXCLUSION OF CORPORATE OFFICERS.  Sec. 4(e); Passport E60816568 (China); National ID No. 372901197604210416 (China) (individual) [IRAN-EO13846]. 

 

XU, Yazhou (Chinese Simplified: 徐亚洲; Chinese Traditional: 徐亞洲), 30-2-501 Fengyuan Street, Dalian, Liaoning 116013, China; DOB 27 Sep 1957; POB Dalian, China; Email Address ymxm505@gmail.com; Executive Order 13846 information: FOREIGN EXCHANGE.  Sec. 5(a)(ii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BANKING TRANSACTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(iii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY.  Sec. 5(a)(iv); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: IMPORT SANCTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(vi); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: EXCLUSION OF CORPORATE OFFICERS.  Sec. 4(e); Passport E66409954 (China); National ID No. 210202195709271752 (individual) [IRAN-EO13846].

and entities:

CHINA CONCORD PETROLEUM CO., LIMITED (Chinese Simplified: 中和石油有限公司) (f.k.a. FAITHFUL LINKER LIMITED (Chinese Traditional: 信聯行有限公司)), 17th Floor, Siu Ying Commercial Building, 151-155 Queen’s Road Central, Hong Kong; Email Address admin@sinocpa.com; Executive Order 13846 information: FOREIGN EXCHANGE.  Sec. 5(a)(ii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BANKING TRANSACTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(iii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY.  Sec. 5(a)(iv); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON.  Sec. 5(a)(v); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: IMPORT SANCTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(vi); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. Sec. 5(a)(vii); Business Registration Number 1080134 [IRAN-EO13846]. 

 

COSCO SHIPPING TANKER (DALIAN) CO., LTD. (a.k.a. COSCO SHIPPING TANKER DALIAN; a.k.a. DALIAN OCEAN SHIPPING CO., LTD.; a.k.a. DALIAN OCEAN SHIPPING COMPANY; a.k.a. DALIAN YUANYANG YUNSHU GONGSI; a.k.a. DALIAN YUANYANG YUNSHU YOUXIAN GONGSI; a.k.a. DALIAN ZHONGYUAN HAIYUN YOUPIN YUNSHU YOUXIAN GONGSI (Chinese Traditional: 大連中遠海運油品運輸有限公司)), Building B, Dalian International Ocean Building, No. 6, Youhao Plaza, Zhongshan District, Dalian, Liaoning 116001, China; Executive Order 13846 information: FOREIGN EXCHANGE.  Sec. 5(a)(ii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BANKING TRANSACTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(iii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY.  Sec. 5(a)(iv); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON.  Sec. 5(a)(v); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: IMPORT SANCTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(vi); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. Sec. 5(a)(vii); Registration Number 912102001184172667 [IRAN-EO13846]. 

 

COSCO SHIPPING TANKER (DALIAN) SEAMAN AND SHIP MANAGEMENT CO., LTD. (a.k.a. COSCO SHIPPING SEAMAN SHP MGMT), 29, Qiqi Jie, Zhongshan Qu, Dalian, Liaoning 116001, China; Executive Order 13846 information: FOREIGN EXCHANGE.  Sec. 5(a)(ii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BANKING TRANSACTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(iii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY.  Sec. 5(a)(iv); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON.  Sec. 5(a)(v); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: IMPORT SANCTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(vi); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. Sec. 5(a)(vii) [IRAN-EO13846]. 

 

KUNLUN HOLDING COMPANY LTD., Vistra Corporate Services Centre, Wickhams Cay II, Road Town, Tortola VG1110, Virgin Islands, British; Executive Order 13846 information: FOREIGN EXCHANGE.  Sec. 5(a)(ii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BANKING TRANSACTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(iii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY.  Sec. 5(a)(iv); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON.  Sec. 5(a)(v); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: IMPORT SANCTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(vi); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. Sec. 5(a)(vii) [IRAN-EO13846]. 

 

KUNLUN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED (Chinese Traditional: 香港昆侖船務有限公司), 17th Floor, Siu Ying Commercial Building, 151-155 Queen’s Road Central, Hong Kong; Building 5, 815 Dongdaming Lu, Hongkou Qu, Shanghai 200082, China; Website http://www.kunlunholding.com; Email Address admin@sinocpa.com; Executive Order 13846 information: FOREIGN EXCHANGE.  Sec. 5(a)(ii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BANKING TRANSACTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(iii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY.  Sec. 5(a)(iv); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON.  Sec. 5(a)(v); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: IMPORT SANCTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(vi); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. Sec. 5(a)(vii); Business Registration Number 1298446 [IRAN-EO13846]. 

 

PEGASUS 88 LIMITED, 17th Floor, Siu Ying Commercial Building, 151-155 Queen’s Road Central, Hong Kong; Executive Order 13846 information: FOREIGN EXCHANGE.  Sec. 5(a)(ii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BANKING TRANSACTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(iii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY.  Sec. 5(a)(iv); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON.  Sec. 5(a)(v); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: IMPORT SANCTIONS.  Sec. 5(a)(vi); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. Sec. 5(a)(vii); Business Registration Number 2757748 [IRAN-EO13846]. 

to its Iran sanctions program, and issued a new FAQ:

Do sanctions on COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Co. and COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Seaman & Ship Management Co. apply to their corporate parent and affiliates?

COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Co. and COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Seaman & Ship Management Co. were determined by the Secretary of State on September 25, 2019, to meet the criteria for the imposition of sanctions under Executive Order (E.O.) 13846, and the Secretary of State imposed certain sanctions, including blocking, on these entities. The blocking sanctions apply only to these listed entities and any entities in which they own, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest. Sanctions do not apply to these entities’ ultimate parent, COSCO Shipping Corporation Ltd. (COSCO). Similarly, sanctions do not apply to COSCO’s other subsidiaries or affiliates (e.g., COSCO Shipping Holdings), provided that such entities are not owned 50 percent or more in the aggregate by one or more blocked persons. U.S. persons, therefore, are not prohibited from dealing with COSCO, its non-blocked subsidiaries, or non-blocked affiliates to the extent the proposed dealings do not involve any blocked person, or any other activities prohibited pursuant to any OFAC sanctions authorities. Similarly, non-U.S. persons do not face sanctions risk for engaging in transactions with COSCO, its non-blocked subsidiaries, or non-blocked affiliates. [09-25-2019]

about it.

Links:

OFAC Notice

FAQ

“The regime in #Iran is the world’s leading state sponsor of terror. The Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign is working; the campaign will continue as long as the Iranian regime pursues its destabilizing behavior.”

– Department of State, Twitter, September 18

SECRETARY POMPEO MEETS WITH SAUDI CROWN PRINCE IN WAKE OF ABQAIQ-KHURAIS ATTACK

“Met with #Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman today to discuss the unprecedented attacks against Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure. The U.S. stands with #SaudiArabia and supports its right to defend itself. The Iranian regime’s threatening behavior will not be tolerated.”

– Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Twitter, September 18

  • Secretary Michael R. Pompeo met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud on September 18. The Secretary and the Crown Prince discussed the recent attacks by Iran against oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. The Secretary and the Crown Prince agreed that this was an unacceptable and unprecedented attack that not only threatened Saudi Arabian national security, but also endangered the world’s energy supply in general.

  • The Secretary and the Crown Prince discussed the need for the international community to come together to counter the continued threat of the Iranian regime and agreed that the Iranian regime must be held accountable for its continued reckless and threatening behavior.

  • Please see the press statement and remarks to the traveling press for more information.

U.S. SANCTIONS IRAN’S CENTRAL BANK, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUND, AND ETEMAD TEJARAT PARS

“The U.S. has sanctioned Iran’s Central Bank and National Development Fund, both of which finance the regime’s terrorism. Attacking other nations and disrupting the global economy has a price. The regime must be held accountable through diplomatic isolation and economic pressure.”

– Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Twitter, September 20

  • In a failed attempt to disrupt the global economy, the Islamic Republic of Iran attacked the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These aggressive attacks were sophisticated in their planning and brazen in their execution. Regardless of transparent attempts to shift blame, the evidence points to Iran—and only Iran. As a result, President Trump instructed his administration to substantially increase the already-historic sanctions on the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism.

  • The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), the National Development Fund of Iran (NDF), and Etemad Tejarat Pars Co. under its counterterrorism authority, Executive Order (E.O.) 13224. Iran’s Central Bank has provided billions of dollars to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), its Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and its terrorist proxy, Hizballah.

  • This action targets the CBI for its financial support to the IRGC-QF and Hizballah. In May 2018, OFAC designated the CBI’s then-Governor Valiollah Seif, and the Assistant Director of the International Department Ali Tarzali, for facilitating financial transfers for the IRGC-QF and Hizballah. Also, in November 2018 and as part of Treasury’s disruption of an international oil-for-terror network, OFAC designated the CBI’s International Department Director Rasul Sajjad, and the CBI’s International Department Director, Hossein Yaghoobi, for conducting financial transactions for the IRGC-QF.

  • As a result of this action, all property and interests in property of these entities that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.

  • Please see the press statement and the Department of Treasury for more information.

Link:

Fact Sheet

On Friday, OFAC added the following entities:

ETEMAD TEJARATE PARS CO., No. 101 Sohrevardi St., Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [SDGT] (Linked To: MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS). 

 

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUND OF IRAN (a.k.a. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUND OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (Arabic: صندوق توسعه ملی جمهوری اسلامی ایران)), No. 25 Gandhi St., Building National Development Fund of Iran, Tehran 15176-55911, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [SDGT] [IRGC] [IFSR] (Linked To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (IRGC)-QODS FORCE; Linked To: MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS).

to the Iran and/or counter terrorism programs. Also, the following record for the Central Bank was updated:

BANK MARKAZI JOMHOURI ISLAMI IRAN (a.k.a. BANK MARKAZI IRAN; a.k.a. CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN; a.k.a. CENTRAL BANK OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN), PO Box 15875/7177, 144 Mirdamad Blvd, Tehran, Iran; 213 Ferdowsi Avenue, Tehran 11365, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [IRAN]. -to- BANK MARKAZI JOMHOURI ISLAMI IRAN (a.k.a. BANK MARKAZI IRAN; a.k.a. CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN; a.k.a. CENTRAL BANK OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (Arabic: بانک مرکزی جمهوری اسلامی ایران)), PO Box 15875/7177, 144 Mirdamad Blvd, Tehran, Iran; 213 Ferdowsi Avenue, Tehran 11365, Iran; Mirdamad Blvd, 144 – P.O. Box 15875/7/77, Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [IRAN] [SDGT] [IRGC] [IFSR] (Linked To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (IRGC)-QODS FORCE; Linked To: HIZBALLAH). 

 

And Treasury:

PRESS RELEASES

Treasury Sanctions Iran’s Central Bank and National Development Fund

Action targets major sources of funding for the regime’s proxies and terrorist arms, including the IRGC, the Qods Force, Hizballah and the Houthis

WASHINGTON- Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), the National Development Fund of Iran (NDF), and Etemad Tejarate Pars Co. under its counterterrorism authority, Executive Order (E.O.) 13224.  Iran’s Central Bank has provided billions of dollars to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), its Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and its terrorist proxy, Hizballah.  Iran’s NDF, which is Iran’s sovereign wealth fund and whose board of trustees include Iran’s president, oil minister, and the governor of the Central Bank, has been a major source of foreign currency and funding for the IRGC-QF and Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).  Etemad Tejarate Pars, also designated today, is an Iran-based company that is used to conceal financial transfers for MODAFL’s military purchases, including funds originating from the NDF.

“Iran’s brazen attack against Saudi Arabia is unacceptable.  Treasury’s action targets a crucial funding mechanism that the Iranian regime uses to support its terrorist network, including the Qods Force, Hizballah, and other militants that spread terror and destabilize the region.  The United States will continue its maximum pressure campaign against Iran’s repressive regime, which attempts to achieve its revolutionary agenda through regional aggression while squandering the country’s oil proceeds,” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin.  “Iran’s Central Bank and the National Development Fund were ostensibly intended to safeguard the welfare of the Iranian people, but have been used instead by this corrupt regime to move Iran’s foreign currency reserves for terrorist proxies.”

“We are putting governments on notice that they are risking the integrity of their financial systems by continuing to work with the Iranian regime’s arm of terror finance, its Central Bank,” said Sigal Mandelker, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “We will vigorously enforce our sanctions to cut off the Iranian regime’s funding of global terrorism and its domestic oppression of the Iranian people, who are the regime’s longest suffering victims.”

CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN FUNDS THE IRGC, ITS QODS FORCE AND HIZBALLAH

Today’s action targets the CBI for its financial support to the IRGC-QF and Hizballah.  In May 2018, OFAC designatedthe CBI’s then-Governor Valiollah Seif, and the Assistant Director of the International Department Ali Tarzali, for facilitating financial transfers for the IRGC-QF and Hizballah.  Also, in November 2018 and as part of Treasury’s disruption of an international oil-for-terror network, OFAC designated the CBI’s International Department Director Rasul Sajjad, and the CBI’s International Department Director, Hossein Yaghoobi, for conducting financial transactions for the IRGC-QF.

Since at least 2016, the IRGC-QF has received the vast majority of its foreign currency from the CBI and senior CBI officials have worked directly with the IRGC-QF to facilitate CBI’s financial support to the IRGC-QF. In 2017, the IRGC-QF oversaw the transfer of tens of millions of euros to Iraq from the CBI. Then-Governor of the CBI Valiollah Seif directed the transfer.

During 2018 and early 2019, the CBI facilitated the transfer of several billion of U.S. dollars and euros to the IRGC-QF and hundreds of millions to MODAFL from the NDF.  Additionally, millions were to be transferred to the Houthis. CBI has also coordinated with the IRGC-QF to transfer funds to Hizballah.

OFAC is designating the CBI today for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to, the IRGC-QF and Hizballah.

The IRGC-QF, which was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 25, 2007, is a branch of the IRGC responsible for external operations and has provided material support to numerous terrorist groups, including the Taliban, Hizballah, HAMAS, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, making it a key component of Iran’s destabilizing regional activities. The IRGC, including its external arm, the IRGC-QF, was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on April 8, 2019.

Hizballah was designated by the Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in October 1997 pursuant to E.O. 13224 in October 2001.  It was also designated in August 2012 pursuant to E.O. 13582, which targets the Government of Syria and its supporters.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUND: A SLUSH FUND FOR THE IRGC-QF AND MODAFL

According to Article 84 of the Fifth Development Plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the NDF was established to serve the welfare of the Iranian people by allocating revenues that originated from selling oil, gas, gas condensate, and oil products to durable wealth and productive economic investments.  However, the NDF has been used as a slush fund for the IRGC-QF, which has, for years, received hundreds of millions of dollars in cash disbursements from the NDF.

The NDF, in coordination with the CBI, provided the IRGC-QF with half a billion U.S. dollars in 2017 and hundreds of millions of dollars in 2018. Also, despite an increase in the IRGC’s overall budget for 2019, the Rouhani administration withdrew some $4.8 billion from the NDF in January 2019 to amend the budget allocated to the IRGC and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB).

The IRIB was designated pursuant to E.O. 13628 in February 2013 for assisting or denying the free flow of information to or from the Iranian people. IRIB was implicated in censoring multiple media outlets and airing forced confessions from detainees.   

During 2018 and early 2019, the CBI facilitated the transfer of hundreds of millions to both the Atomic Energy Organization and MODAFL from the NDF.  Some of the funds to be transferred via Iran-based Etemad Tejarate Pars Co. were intended to be used for military purchases.

As of early 2019, Etemad Tejarate Pars Co. planned to send tens of millions in various currencies, including euros, to Wilmington General Trading LLC in Dubai, UAE, the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Moscow, Russia, and to companies on behalf of MODAFL.

OFAC is designating NDF for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to, the IRGC-QF and MODAFL.

OFAC is designating Etemad Tejarate Pars Co. for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to, MODAFL.

On March 26, 2019, OFAC designated MODAFL pursuant to E.O. 13224 for its role in assisting the IRGC-QF. Wilmington General Trading LLC was also designated on March 26, 2019 for being owned or controlled by Asadollah Seifi who obfuscated millions of dollars’ worth of transactions benefiting the Iranian regime and the purchase of foreign currency for the IRGC.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these entities that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC.  OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.

In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the entities designated today may themselves be exposed to designation.  Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant financial transaction or provides significant financial services for entities designated in connection with Iran’s support for international terrorism or any Iranian person on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons could be subject to U.S. correspondent account or payable-through account sanctions.

The United States has a long standing policy of allowing for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine and medical devices, and OFAC will continue to consider requests related to humanitarian trade with Iran as appropriate.

Identifying information on the entities designated today.

and State:

In a failed attempt to disrupt the global economy, the Islamic Republic of Iran attacked the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This act of aggression was sophisticated in its planning and brazen in its execution. Regardless of transparent attempts to shift blame, the evidence points to Iran—and only Iran. As a result, President Trump instructed his administration to substantially increase the already-historic sanctions on the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. Today, we have followed through on his direction.

The United States has sanctioned Iran’s Central Bank and its National Development Fund, as well as Etemad Tejarat Pars, an Iran-based company, which has been found to conceal financial transfers for military purchases. These entities support the regime’s terrorism and regional aggression by financing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, its Qods Force, and Hizballah, the Iranian regime’s chief proxy force.

Attacking other nations and disrupting the global economy has a price. The regime in Tehran must be held accountable through diplomatic isolation and economic pressure. Our campaign of maximum pressure will continue to raise costs on the Islamic Republic of Iran until it reverses its destabilizing policies across the Middle East and around the world.

issued press releases.

Somehow, Mr. Watchlist expected more – perhaps the US is running out of things to sanction.

Links:

OFAC Notice

Press Releases- Treasury, State