The following persons:
JAVANI, Yadollah (Arabic: یدالله جوانی), Iran; DOB 1962; POB Isfahan, Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; Deputy Political Commander (individual) [IRGC] [IFSR] [IRAN-HR] (Linked To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS).
MAJID, Vahid Mohammad Naser (a.k.a. MAJID, Vahid (Arabic: وحید محید)), Tehran, Iran; DOB 15 Aug 1964; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; National ID No. 3874409929 (Iran); Second Brigadier General (individual) [IRAN-TRA] (Linked To: IRANIAN CYBER POLICE).
NEJAT, Hossein (Arabic: حسین نجات) (a.k.a. ZIBAEE NEJAD, Mohammad Hossein (Arabic: محمدحسین زیبایینژاد)), Tehran, Iran; DOB Mar 1955 to Mar 1956; POB Shiraz, Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; IRGC Brigadier General (individual) [IRGC] [IFSR] [IRAN-HR] (Linked To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS).
RAHIMI, Hossein (Arabic: حسین رحیمی), Tehran, Iran; DOB Mar 1963 to Mar 1964; POB Markazi Province, Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; Police chief of Tehran (individual) [IRAN-HR] (Linked To: LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN).
SAJEDINIA, Hossein (Arabic: حسین ساجدی نیا) (a.k.a. SAJEDI-NIA, Hossein), Iran; DOB 21 Mar 1962 to 20 Apr 1962; POB Isfahan, Isfahan Province, Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; Deputy Operations Commander (individual) [IRAN-HR] (Linked To: LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN).
ZAREPOUR, Eisa (Arabic: عیسی زارعپور) (a.k.a. ZAREPOUR, Isa; a.k.a. ZAREPOUR, Issa), Iran; DOB 21 Apr 1980; POB Eslamabad-e Gharb, Kermanshah, Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; Passport E96027104 (Iran) expires 29 Sep 2020; alt. Passport U39823438 (Iran) expires 13 Nov 2021; alt. Passport E20082749 (Iran) expires 21 Jan 2016; National ID No. 3341246576 (Iran) (individual) [IRAN-TRA].
have been added to OFAC’s Iran-related sanctions program, and the following persons:
MYINT, Aung Moe (a.k.a. MYINT, Aung; a.k.a. MYINT, Aung Mo), Waizayandar Road, No.15, Ngwe Kyar Yan Quarter, South Okkalapa Township, Yangon Region, Burma; DOB 09 Jun 1971; alt. DOB 28 Sep 1969; nationality Burma; Gender Male; Registration Number 12/YAKANA(N)006981 (Burma) (individual) [BURMA-EO14014].
MYINT, Hlaing Moe, Burma; DOB 09 Jun 1971; nationality Burma; Gender Male; Registration Number 12/YAKANA(N)006982 (Burma) (individual) [BURMA-EO14014] (Linked To: DYNASTY INTERNATIONAL COMPANY LIMITED).
THITSAR, Myo, Burma; DOB 24 Nov 1972; nationality Burma; Gender Female; Registration Number 12/BAHANA(N)002332 (Burma) (individual) [BURMA-EO14014] (Linked To: DYNASTY INTERNATIONAL COMPANY LIMITED).
and entity:
DYNASTY INTERNATIONAL COMPANY LIMITED (a.k.a. DYNASTY GROUP OF COMPANIES; a.k.a. "DGC"; a.k.a. "DYNASTY INTERNATIONAL"), Waizayandar Road, No.15, Ngwe Kyar Yan Quarter, South Okkalapa Township, Yangon Region, Burma; Registration Number 100720744 (Burma) issued 27 Feb 1997 [BURMA-EO14014] (Linked To: MYINT, Aung Moe).
have been added to the Burma-related program. In addition, the following existing designation to the Iran and weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation (NPWMD) programs has been updated:
VAHIDI, Ahmad, c/o MODAFL, Tehran, Iran; DOB 1958; POB Shiraz, Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Brigadier General (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR]. -to- VAHIDI, Ahmad (Arabic: احمد وحیدی) (a.k.a. CHERAGHI, Ahmad Shah), c/o MODAFL, Tehran, Iran; DOB 27 Jun 1958; POB Shiraz, Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; Brigadier General (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR] [IRAN-HR].
And the Treasury Department issued a press release about the Burma changes:
PRESS RELEASES
Treasury Sanctions Arms Dealers for Providing Support to Burma’s Military Regime
October 6, 2022
WASHINGTON – Today the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated three individuals and one entity connected to Burma’s military regime pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14014. Following the February 1, 2021, coup that overthrew Burma’s democratically elected civilian government, the military has committed numerous atrocities against people in Burma, including the violent repression of political dissent, the killing of over 2,300 innocent civilians, and displacement of more than 900,000 people.
Burma’s military regime has continued its severe oppression and acts of violence against people in Burma. The United States will hold accountable those who enable and facilitate these heinous acts. The sanctions announced today target those who profit from the oppressive actions of the regime by operating in the defense sectors of Burma’s economy and providing arms and other material support to Burma’s military. These sanctions do not target the people of Burma, who have suffered under the brutal rule of the regime for far too long.
“Today we are targeting the support networks and war profiteers that enable weapons procurement for Burma’s military regime,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “Treasury will continue to take action to degrade the Burmese military’s ability to commit brutal acts of violence against the people of Burma.”
Today, the Department of State also designated former Burma police chief and deputy Home Affairs minister Than Hlaing under Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022, for his involvement in gross violations of human rights, namely the extrajudicial killing of peaceful protestors in February 2021.
ARMS DEALERS
Aung Moe Myint is a Burmese national and businessman with close ties to the Burmese military and is the son of a Burmese military officer. Since the February 2021 coup, Aung Moe Myint has facilitated various arms deals and weapons purchases on behalf of Burma’s military. Aung Moe Myint was sanctioned by the European Union on February 21, 2022, and by the United Kingdom on March 25, 2022. Additionally, Aung Moe Myint has used the company he owns, Dynasty International Company Limited, to facilitate the Burmese military’s procurement of various weapons, armaments, missiles, and aircraft.
Aung Moe Myint is being designated pursuant to E.O. 14014 for operating in the defense sector of the Burmese economy.
Dynasty International Company Limited is a Burmese company that was founded by Aung Moe Myint and has been used to facilitate arms deals on behalf of the Burmese military, to include the import of aircraft parts.
Dynasty International Company Limited is being designated pursuant to E.O. 14014 for being owned or controlled by, or for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Aung Moe Myint.
Hlaing Moe Myint is a Burmese national who jointly established Dynasty International Company Limited with his brother, Aung Moe Myint, and was a director of Dynasty International Company Limited until February 2022.
Myint is being designated pursuant to E.O. 14014 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, of Dynasty International Company Limited.
Myo Thitsar is a Burmese national who is a director of Dynasty International Company Limited and coordinated arms deals between Dynasty International Company Limited and a major foreign military equipment exporter.
Myo Thitsar is being designated pursuant to E.O. 14014 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Dynasty International Company Limited.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, pursuant to E.O. 14014, all property and interests in property of the persons named above that are in the United States, or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.
Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or otherwise exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
U.S. sanctions need not be permanent. Sanctions are intended to bring about a positive change of behavior. Consistent with the findings of the 2021 Treasury Sanctions Review, the removal of sanctions is available for persons designated under E.O. 14014 who take concrete and meaningful actions to restore civilian government and disassociate themselves from the military regime in Burma, as well as the military’s financers and suppliers outside of Burma.
U.S. Treasury Department Press Release
and another about the Iran changes:
PRESS RELEASES
Treasury Sanctions Iranian Leaders Responsible for Internet Shutdown and Violent Crackdown on Peaceful Protests
October 6, 2022
WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating seven senior leaders within Iran’s government and security apparatus for the shutdown of Iran’s Internet access and the continued violence against peaceful protesters in the wake of the tragic death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who was arrested for allegedly wearing a hijab improperly, and died in the custody of Iran’s Morality Police. Today’s action follows OFAC’s September 22 designation of Iran’s Morality Police, its senior leadership, and other senior leaders of Iran’s security organizations. Together with the release of Iran General License D-2, which authorizes exports of additional tools to assist Iranians in accessing the Internet, these designations demonstrate the United States’ commitment to free, peaceful assembly and open communication.
“The rights to freedom of expression and of peaceful assembly are vital to guaranteeing individual liberty and dignity,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury Brian Nelson. “The United States condemns the Iranian government’s Internet shutdown and continued violent suppression of peaceful protest and will not hesitate to target those who direct and support such actions.”
Today’s actions are taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13553, which authorizes sanctions with respect to serious human rights abuses by the Government of Iran, and E.O. 13846, which authorizes sanctions for engaging in censorship or other activities with respect to Iran.
GOVERNMENT MINISTERS
Iran’s Minister of the Interior, Ahmad Vahidi, maintains oversight over all Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) deployed to subdue protests in Iran, including the ongoing protests over the death of Mahsa Amini. The LEF has used lethal force against protesters on multiple occasions in the past, making it a key instrument of the Iranian regime in its ongoing repression of its own people. The LEF’s actions have resulted in thousands of deaths, including at least dozens of casualties in the recent demonstrations against the Morality Police. In the past, Vahidi has warned Iranian women that the government’s security forces will penalize those “breaking rules” in reference to hijab compliance. Recently, Vahidi has explicitly threatened protesters who continue to challenge the regime and has defended the brutal actions of LEF officers in suppressing ongoing protests.
Vahidi is being redesignated today pursuant to E.O. 13553 for being an official of the Government of Iran and being responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Iran or Iranian citizens or residents, or the family members of the foregoing, on or after June 12, 2009, regardless of whether such abuses occurred in Iran.
Vahidi was previously designated under E.O. 13382 on June 16, 2010, for ties to Iran’s nuclear and WMD programs. During his time as head of the IRGC’s Qods Force, the group’s external operations arm, Vahidi oversaw the bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association building in Buenos Aires, Argentina, which killed 85 people and wounded hundreds.
Eisa Zarepour, the Minister of Communications, is responsible for the Iranian government’s shameful attempt to block the Internet access of millions of Iranians in the hopes of slowing down the protests. Zarepour, who has called social media platforms vehicles for carrying the messages of protesters, has indicated that the Internet clampdown and silencing of voices online will continue as long as protests persist.
Zarepour is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13846 for having engaged in censorship or other activities with respect to Iran on or after June 12, 2009, that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran, or that limit access to print or broadcast media, including the facilitation or support of intentional frequency manipulation by the Government of Iran or an entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran that would jam or restrict an international signal.
SECURITY SERVICES SENIOR LEADERSHIP
Hossein Sajedinia, the Deputy Operations Commander of the LEF, and Yadollah Javani, the Deputy Political Commander of the IRGC, have led their respective organizations in violently suppressing protests. In April 2019, Sajedinia announced the deployment of over 8,000 male and female undercover Morality Police officers to identify and punish dress code offenders. Vahid Mohammad Naser Majid, the head of the Iranian Cyber Police, has leveraged the Iranian Cyber Police to regularly monitor Iranian Internet users, filter websites, and block content the Iranian government finds objectionable.
Sajedinia is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Iran’s LEF. Javani is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC. Majid is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13846 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of the Iranian Cyber Police, an Iranian person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13628.
Hossein Nejat, an IRGC commander and close associate of Iran’s Supreme Leader, is head of Sarallah, the IRGC’s security apparatus based in Tehran that is tasked with quelling anti-government protests. Hossein Rahimi is Iran’s LEF police chief in Tehran, who oversees much of the Morality Police’s hijab compliance enforcement in the capital. Rahimi has spearheaded Iran’s controversial and oppressive “Nazer plan” in Tehran. The Nazer (“Observe” in Persian) plan has placed Morality Police throughout the capital to watch and punish women who improperly wear the hijab.
Nejat is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC. Rahimi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Iran’s LEF.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these individuals that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.
In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individuals designated today may themselves be exposed to sanctions or subject to an enforcement action. Furthermore, unless an exception applies, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for any of the individuals designated today could be subject to U.S. sanctions.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please visit here.
U.S. Treasury Department Press Release
Links:
Treasury Press Releases – Iran, Burma
Categories: Burma Sanctions Iranian Sanctions OFAC Updates Sanctions Lists
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